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CHIARELLA V. UNITED STATES*: THE
SUPREME COURT'S COMMON LAW
CATCH TO MARKET INSIDER
LIABILITY UNDER 10b-5
INTRODUCTION

Rule lOb-5, promulgated under section 10(b)I of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,2 conditions an insider's 3 right to trade
in securities upon full disclosure of material nonpublic information. Classic application of lOb-5 is to transactions involving corporate executives and others who become aware of changes or
decisions likely to influence the value of corporate shares in advance of other traders. The rule does not, however, operate cate* 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
1. Section 10(b) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or
of any facility of any national securities exchange(a) To effect a short sale, or to use or employ any stop-loss order
in connection with the purchase or sale, of any security registered on a
national securities exchange, in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in
the public interest or for the protection of investors.
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the
Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public
interest or for the protection of investors.
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976).
Rule 10b-5 was promulgated under section 10(b) and provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or
of any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made,
in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1979).
2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-kk (1976).
3. At the minimum, insider trading is the buying and selling of corporate shares by officers, directors and stockholders who own more than 10%
of the stock of a corporation listed on the national exchange. At issue in the
Chiarella case was the propriety of expanding that definition to include
other categories of persons with access to material, nonpublic information.
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gorically against any singular class of persons. Read literally, it
4
is applicable to "any" person.
Perhaps because of its elastic language, 10b-5 has, since its
inception in 1942, been liberally applied to a myriad of transactions characterized by the courts as "insider trades."5 Precedent established during the 1960's and early 1970's greatly
broadened the concept of insider liability and increased the
rule's potential as an antifraud device. 6 Chiarella v. United
States 7 is recent indicia of the Supreme Court's attempt to reverse that trend.
On March 18, 1980, the Supreme Court reversed the conviction of Vincent Chiarella, an employee of a Wall Street printing
firm who had been prosecuted under section 10(b) and rule lOb5 of the Exchange Act. As a "markup man"8 for Pandick Press,
Mr. Chiarella had access to confidential client files which outlined the details of prospective tender offers 9 and mergers. 10 Al4. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b.5 (1979).
5. See A. BROMBERG, SEcuRrrxEs LAW: FRAUD-RULE 1OB-5 § 1.1, at 5
(1968). Frequent resort to the rule may be the result of its relatively loose
jurisdictional requirements as well. Use of the telephone, clearly an instrumentality of interstate commerce, is enough to bring a transaction within
the cognizance of the federal courts. Nationwide service of process and
broad venue provisions are a further attraction.
6. In a series of administrative decisions and injunctive proceedings
commencing in 1961, the SEC broadened the applicability of rule lOb-5 as a
general prohibition against trading on nonpublic information in anonymous
stock exchange transactions as well as in face-to-face dealings. Two of the
most significant decisions were SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833
2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969) and In re Cady, Roberts &Co.,
S.E.C. 907 (1961).
The federal courts also made expansive use of the antifraud provisions
during the 1960's and early 1970's. See, e.g., Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United
States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972) (extended lob-5 liability to bankers with no relationship to the issuing corporation but upon whom plaintiffs nevertheless
relied); Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life &Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 653 (1971)
(expanded the definition of "inconnection with"); SEC v. National Sec., 393
U.S. 453 (1969) (expanded the definition of "purchase or sale"); SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180 (1963) (expanded the concept of
"fraud").
7. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
8. Financial printers, such as Pandick, service investment houses,
banks, corporations, and other large institutions. They specialize in printing disclosure statements, newspaper announcements, proxies, merger
proposals, tender offers and various other business documents. As a
markup man, Chiarella received customer copies first, and it was his job to
arrange the type and disseminate pages to copy cutters.
9. An offer to purchase shares made by one company directly to the
stockholders of another company is a tender offer. The term "tender offer"
is not defined in the Exchange Act, but it has been held not to encompass
purchases in the open market, whether or not made for purpose of obtaining control. Water & Wall Assoc. v. American Consumer Indus., [1973]
FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) $ 93,943 (D.N.J. 1973). A tender offer has been held
to include "any public invitation to a corporation's shareholders to purchase
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though some of the information was received in coded form,
between September 1975 and November 1976, Chiarella managed to identify the parties to five impending takeovers. 1 He
invested in target securities before the tender offers were published and profited handsomely from the subsequent rise in the
12
price of his stock once the bids were announced.
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 13 challenged Chiarella's failure to disclose material, 14 nonpublic information prior to using that information as an exclusive trading
advantage on the stock market. However, Justice Powell, writing for the Supreme Court majority, ruled that mere nondisclosure of market information was not actionable fraud under rule
lOb-5 absent a confidential or fiduciary relationship between
Chiarella and the individuals who sold him target stock.'5 The
Court flatly rejected any notion that lOb-5 liability could be
based solely upon a trader's informational advantage in an arm's
length transaction.
their stock.. . ." Smallwood v. Pearl Bresing Co., 489 F.2d 579 (5th Cir.
1974). Note that tender offers may also be referred to as takeover bids. See
generally 5 A. JACOBS, THE IMPACT OF RULE lOb-5 § 5 (1980) [hereinafter
cited as JACOBS].
10. Corporations merge when one company acquires the assets, liabilities, franchises, and powers of another. Since mergers have provided an
important vehicle to positions of market dominance, they are regulated and
scrutinized under the provisions of section 7 of the Clayton Act. 15 U.S.C.
§ 18 (1976).
11. United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358, 1363 (1978). The documents
Chiarella received provided vital information, such as the market in which
the shares were traded, the par value, the number of shares outstanding,
and the highs and lows for the previous year. By comparing these figures
with a stock guide book he received from his broker, Chiarella deduced the
names of the subject corporations.
12. For a more detailed analysis of the way in which publication of a
tender offer affects the value of target stock, see Fleischer & Mundheim,
CorporateAcquisition by Tender Offer, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 317 (1967).
13. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) was created in
1934 as an independent, quasi-judicial agency of the United States government, to administer the Securities Act and the Exchange Act. In its capacity as a judicial body, the SEC is empowered to discipline brokers, dealers,
and investment advisers registered with it. SEC decisions are not controlling on courts in civil actions but they are often persuasive. Pursuant to
section 21(d) of the Exchange Act, the SEC can transmit evidence of a
crime to the Attorney General. The existence of this referral power allows
the SEC to bring suit in federal district court. JACOBS, supra note 9, at § 5.
14. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849-50 (2d Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). The basic test of "materiality" is whether a
reasonable investor would consider the information relevant to his determination of a choice of action in a particular transaction. See also, Affiliated
Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1971); List v. Fashion Park, Inc.,
340 F.2d 457, 462 (2d Cir. 1965); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 5382(a)
(1938); accord, Koher v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634, 642 (7th Cir. 1963).
15. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 230 (1980).
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The rule of the Chiarella case, that silence does not amount
to fraud unless there is an affirmative duty to speak, is fashioned
after the common law of fraud and deceit.16 The imposition of a
common law constraint upon application of lOb-5 is consonant
with the conservatism which has characterized the Supreme
Court's approach to lOb-5 and other antifraud provisions since
1975.17 In a series of decisions, beginning with Blue Chip Stamps
v. Manor Drug Stores,18 the Supreme Court has consistently
limited the scope of the rule.
Despite the latest departure from expansive use of rule 10b5, the Chiarella decision should not be perceived as a judicially
created loophole through which investors can get rich quick on
confidential information. A perfunctory look at the six to three
16. Common law has greatly influenced the development of rule lOb-5 as
an antifraud device. Particularly during the 1950's, courts invoked tort law
to restrict 10b-5 liability. See generally, 2 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION
1430-31 (2d ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited as Loss].
The common law elements of a claim for fraud and deceit have been
described as false representation of a material fact made by the defendant
with knowledge of its falsity (or some other element of scienter) and with
the intention that the plaintiff rely thereon, resulting in justifiable reliance
by and consequently damage to, the plaintiff. W. PROSSER, TORTS § 85, at
705-06 (1st ed. 1941); see also Note, The Liability of Directorsand Officersfor
Misrepresentationin the Sale of Securities, 34 COLUM. L. REV. 1090 (1934).

If plaintiff's claim was based on mere nondisclosure, as opposed to express misrepresentation, proof of a fiduciary relationship between the parties, or proof that defendant knew plaintiff was acting under a mistaken
belief as to a material fact was required. Frigitemp Corp. v. Financial Dynamics Fund, Inc., 524 F.2d 275, 283 (2d Cir. 1975). Thus, under the common
law, a corporate insider could sell the stock of his own company with relative impunity because he owed no fiduciary duty to the buyer. In In re
Cady, Roberts &Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 913-14 (1961), the SEC interpreted rule
10b-5 as broader than the common law, imposing an affirmative duty to disclose inside information upon the purchaser of securities without regard to
any fiduciary duty owed the buyer.
The reader should not assume, however, that rule 10b-5 has completely
shed its inhibiting common law heritage. See, e.g., Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) (no private action under 10b-5 unless scienter is alleged); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975)
(under rule 10b-5, plaintiff must be the purchaser or seller of securities to
have standing).
17. See, e.g., Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680 (1980) (the Hochfelder scienter
requirement was extended to actions brought by the SEC); Santa Fe Indus.
v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977). The term "fraud" does not include overreaching by a controlling shareholder unless accompanied by actual deception,
and no person can be held liable for damages under rule 10b-5 unless he can
be shown to have acted with scienter.
The Court has also taken measures to limit private rights of action
under the rule. In Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1 (1977), the unsuccessful contender for control of a target company brought action against the
successful contender for alleged violations of securities laws. Chief Justice
Burger ruled that tender offerors were not within the class of persons the
securities laws were designed to protect. See also Blue Chip Stamps v.
Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
18. 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
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decision does not reveal the discordant interpretations of rule
lOb-5 espoused by members of the Court in two separate concurring and two dissenting opinions. The majority opinion, essentially the opinion of five justices, 19 is dispositive only of the
liability created by Chiarella's legal relationship (or non-relationship) to target shareholders. The Court did not decide
whether Chiarella breached a duty to the acquiring corporation
since that theory was not properly submitted to the jury.20 Several other issues related to the scope of federal control over insider trading were left unresolved. A future Chiarella might not
be permitted to exploit confidential information with impunity.
A critical analysis of Chiarella is necessary lest it be construed as definitive and controlling precedent. The purpose of
this comment is to clarify those propositions which survive the
decision, and to examine the competing philosophies associated
with rule lOb-5. First, some historical background is necessary
in order to place the Exchange Act and rule lOb-5 in their proper
perspective.
ORIGIN OF THE OVERALL SCHEME TO REGULATE

SECURITIES TRANSACTIONS
Both the Securities Act of 1933 and the Exchange Act of
193421 were enacted during the years of economic depression
and faithlessness which followed the stock market crash of
1929.22 The Acts were legislative attempts to restore public confidence in the financial markets of the United States by curbing
the unsavory business practices which characterized the
1920's.23 Broadly speaking, the Securities Act regulates the ini19. The views expressed in Justice Brennan's separate concurring opin-

ion are philosophically at odds with those expressed by the majority. See

notes 131-2 and accompanying text infra.
20. Chiarella's principal defense at trial was the absence of an intent to
defraud. The Court, however, did not charge the jury that specific intent
was a requisite element of the crime. Brief for the Petitioner at 49, United
States v. Chiarella, 99 S. Ct. 2158 (1979).

Further, the jury was not instructed as to the nature or the elements of
the duty owed by Chiarella to anyone other than the target company.
Therefore, whether or not he breached a duty to the acquiring company
(Pandick's customer) was not addressed by the Supreme Court. See 445
U.S. at 236.
21. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78(a)-kk (1976).
22. See J. BROOKS, THE SEVEN FAT YEARS: CHRONICLES OF WALL STREET

169 (1958). In the years immediately preceding the passage of federal securities law, the Wall Street businessman was publicly perceived as an unsavory character a "bloated cigar-smoking plutocrat wearing a top hat, a
cutaway, striped pants, and a dollar sign for a watch fob as he tramples on
widows and orphans."
23. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1934):
If investor confidence is to come back to the benefit of exchanges and
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tial distribution of corporate securities to the investing public.
The principal focus of the Exchange Act, of which section 10(b)
is a part, is the regulation of securities trading after initial issuance. 24 Collectively, the federal securities laws were designed
to protect the investing public by fostering the dissemination of
relevant information 2 5 and by prohibiting manipulative and deceptive practices which might artificially and dishonestly affect
the market price of securities. 26 The Securities Act and the Exchange Act are both administered by the Securities and Exchange Commission.
Legislative History of Section 10(b)
Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act is acknowledged as a
largely judge-made federal law of corporations. 27 The legislative
history of the provision is scant and notably unrevealing as to its
intended scope and application. 28 As a result, judges have been
corporations alike, the law must advance. Unless constant extension of
the legal conception of a fiduciary relationship-a guarantee of 'straight
shooting'-supports the constant extension of mutual confidence ...
easy liquidity of the resources in which wealth is invested is a danger
....
Just in proportion as it becomes more liquid and complicated, an
economic system must become more moderate, more honest, and more
justifiably self-trusting....
See generally Landis, The Legislative History of the Securities Act of 1933, 28
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 29, 38, 46 (1959).
24. R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, SECURITIES REGULATION 2 (4th ed. 1977)
[hereinafter cited as JENNINGS & MARSH].

25. That design is frequently articulated in the specific context of lOb-5
application to nondisclosure cases. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner and Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 235 (2d Cir. 1974) (rule 10b-5
was enacted to promote "full disclosure of inside information so that an informed judgment can be made by all investors who trade.. . ."); Crane v.
Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787, 793 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 822 (1970) (purposes of the Exchange Act include protection of the investing public from manipulative and deceptive devices which mislead traders and which preclude fair and open dealing in the securities markets).
26. See 77 CONG. REC. 2918 (1933). Representative Rayburn expressed

this overall policy of preserving the integrity of the marketplace on behalf
of investors just prior to passage of the Securities Act: "The purpose of this
bill is to place the owners of securities on a parity, so far as is possible, with
the management of the corporations, and to place the buyer on the same
plane so far as available information is concerned, with the seller ....

"

Id.

The Congressman reiterated this view the following year "We should have
a marketplace for the exchange of securities, but it should be a clean and
honest market place." 78 CONG. REC. 7697 (1934). The importance of adequate disclosures of relevant information to investors is further discussed
in Fleischer, Securities Trading and CorporateInformation Practices: The
Implicationsof the Texas GulfSulphur Proceeding,51 VA. L REV. 1271, 1279

(1965).
27. See Fleischer, Federal CorporationLaw: An Assessment, 78 HARv.
L. REV. 746 (1965).
28. JACOBS, supra note 9, at § 5.
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relatively free to interpret the provisions as they believe justice
demands.
What little is known of the legislative purpose behind section 10(b) has been gleaned from the House and Senate floor
debates. The language now contained in section 10(b) was originally submitted as section 9(c) of the bills introduced to Congress. 29 J.M. Landis, a Commissioner of the Federal Trade
Commission 30 and draftsman of the Exchange Act, was the initial witness before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce. He explained that section 9(c) conferred a
general power upon the Commission to proscribe any "manipulative device. '3 1 Thomas G. Corcoran, the administration's principal spokesman, also testified as to the breadth of proposed
section 9(c) and coined it a "catch-all clause" to prevent manipulative devices not within the immediate contemplation of the
32
draftsmen.
The section's broad grant of power prompted a number of
objections, and a modified version which omitted reference to
manipulative or deceptive devices was introduced to Congress.
However, the final draft of section 10(b) emerged from the conference committee with the original prohibitions against manipulative and deceptive devices intact.
29. S. Doc. No. 2693, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934); H.R. REP. No. 7852, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1934); H.R. REP. No. 8720, 73d Cong. 2d Sess. (1934).
30. The Federal Trade Commission was the SEC's predecessor and administered the 1933 Act until 1934.
31. One of the most serious abuses in the securities markets on which
Senate investigators focused in the hearings which led to the enactment of
the 1934 Act, was the operation of "pools" which ran up the prices of securities on an exchange by a series of well-timed transactions, effected solely
for the purpose of "manipulating" the market price of the security. The
combination of persons or corporations comprised by the pool would then
unload its holdings on the public just before the price dropped. Other manipulative devices typically employed in the context of tender or exchange
offers include: trading during a tender offer to induce others to buy or to
sell; making a tender offer without adequate funds to pay for the tendered
stock, and public misrepresentation by a tender offeror to the effect that it
will not make the offer and will unload the target company's stock on the
open market. The foregoing list is far from exhaustive. For a more detailed
analysis of stock market manipulation, see JACOBS, supra note 10, at § 139.
Note also that section 10(b) was wisely worded in the broadest terms. The
drafters realized that the most dangerous species of fraud may have yet to
be invented.
32. Hearings on Stock Exchange Regulation Before the House Committee on Interstateand Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1934). Corcoran is quoted as stating:
,Subsection (c) says, '"Thou shalt not devise any other cunning devices." Of course subsection (c) is a catch-all clause to prevent manipulative devices. I do not think there is any objection to that kind of
clause. The Commission should have the authority to deal with new
manipulative devices. Id.
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Administrative History of Rule 10b-5
Section 10(b), by its terms, was inoperable without a complementary rule of enforcement. Prior to the adoption of rule
lOb-5 in 1942, the Commission was without authority to censure
frauds by purchasers other than brokers and dealers.3 3 The operative language of section 17(a) of the Securities Act 3 4 is almost parallel to that contained in 10(b). Section 17(a), however,
prohibits only the fraudulent sale of securities. 35 No comparable provision proscribed fraudulent practices in connection with
the purchase or sale of securities. Rule 10b-5 was promulgated
to implement section 10(b) and to close this gap in the federal
36
antifraud provisions.
Beyond the manifest intent to extend federal protection to
sellers of securities, the congressional policies which underly
rule lOb-5 cannot be elicited from its sketchy legislative history.3 7 The guiding principles which broaden or delimit the
scope of the rule derive primarily from case law. Consequently,
the rule's potency as an antifraud device is largely determined
38
by the federal courts.
JUDICIAL EXPANSION OF INSIDER LIABILITY UNDER RULE

lOb-5

The drafters of the federal antifraud provisions were clearly
motivated by a need to curb the misuse of relevant investors'
information unavailable to the general public. 3 9 Rule lOb-5 does
not specifically require disclosure of facts known to one party to
a securities transaction and unknown to the other.4° The cases
33. Section 15 of the Exchange Act affords protection to both buyers and
sellers of securities but its prohibitions are limited to fraudulent practices
by brokers in the over-the-counter market. 15 U.S.C. § 78(o) (1976).
34. 15 U.S.C. § 79q(a) (1976).
35. Barnet, Neither a Tipper nor a Tippee Be, 8 Hous. L. REv. 278, 297
n.40 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Barnet]. See also Birnbaum v. Newport
Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461, 463 (2d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952);

Barnet v. Anaconda Co., 238 F. Supp. 766, 774 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
Section 17(a) was enacted during a period of economic depression and
was responsive to the plight of the innocent purchaser of overpriced securities. Economic recovery resulted, more typically, in the purchase of underpriced securities by unlucky sellers. Thus, section 17(a) may be considered

a depression rule and 10(b) may be considered a prosperity rule.

JACOBS,

supra note 10, at § 5.
36. See Exchange Act Release No. 3230 (1942); see also In re Cady, Roberts & Co. 40 S.E.C. 907, 913-14 (1961).

37. See JACOBS, supra note 10, at § 6.
38. Id.
39. See note 23 supra. See also Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F.
Supp. 808, 829 (D. Del. 1951), aftd, 235 F.2d 369 (3d Cir. 1956); Allen, Rule 10b5 and the Burger Court-Time to Reexamine the Elementsfor a 10b-5Action,
82 CoM. L.J. 118, 123-26 (1977).
40. Clause (2) refers to omissions to state material facts only when nec-
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have uniformly held, however, that if the party in exclusive possession of material 4 ' information occupies a fiduciary relationship to the other party to the transaction, rule lOb-5 imposes an
affirmative duty to disclose or abstain from trading.4 This
fiduciary obligation is usually said to arise where one of the parties is a "corporate insider. '43 The courts have had no difficulty
in holding officers, directors," and majority or controlling shareholders 45 to the standards required of corporate insiders. The
difficult and much litigated issue is: Does the disclose or abstain
rule extend to individuals or groups operating outside the corporate structure, but with special access to inside corporate information?
In In Re Cady Roberts & Co.,46 the SEC held a broker-dealer
liable under rule 10b-5 because he purchased stock for preferred
essary "to make the statements made .. . not misleading" and neither
clause (1) nor clause (2) specifically address the duty to disclose.
41. See note 14 supra.
42. The "disclose or abstain" rule was first enunciated in SEC v. Texas
Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 394
U.S. 976 (1969). The rule requires that: "[A]nyone in possession of material
inside information must either disclose it to the investing public, or, if he is
disabled from disclosing it in order to protect a corporate confidence...
must abstain from trading in or recommending the securities concerned
while such information remains undisclosed."
43. See, e.g., In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961). See also
SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394
U.S. 976 (1969).
The courts at common law split as to whom the fiduciary duty to disclose was owed. The majority rule was that corporate insiders owed fiduciary duties to the corporation, not to individual shareholders. Hence, there
was no duty of disclosure to shareholders regarding any inside information
which might affect the value of the shares. "Caveat emptor" applied. Goodwin v. Aggasiz, 283 Mass. 358, 186 N.E. 659 (1933). A minority of the common
law courts held that there was a duty of disclosure to shareholders. See
King Mfg. Co. v. Clay, 216 Ga. 581, 118 S.E.2d 581 (1961).
44. List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 302
U.S. 811 (1965); Ross v. Licht, 263 F. Supp. 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1947).
The Texas Gulf Sulphur case left little doubt that other corporate employees might be liable as insiders even though they were not corporate
executives. By way of analogy, any person regularly employed by the corporation and privy to corporate information falls within the definition of a
corporate insider. Cf. Fischer v. Kletz, 266 F. Supp. 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (accountant held liable for failing to disclose after-acquired information that
the financial statement he prepared for his corporate employer was false.)
45. Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808 (D. Del. 1951) (a majority stockholder's duty of affirmative disclosure to minority stockholders
with whom he deals, stems from the necessity of preventing a corporate
insider from using his position to take advantage of uninformed minority
stockholders); Robinson v. Difford, 92 F. Supp. 145 (E.D. Pa. 1950) (under
section 10(b), a minority stockholder has a right of action against a majority
stockholder who induces him to purchase shares for substantially less than
their true value).
46. 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
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accounts on the basis of inside information received from a director of the issuing corporation. 47 Unquestionably, the director-informant would have been compelled to abstain from
trading prior to public disclosure of the news he revealed to the
broker-dealer. In Cady, the SEC extended liability to the broker-dealer as well, maintaining that the duty to disclose or abstain was triggered by "the existence of a relationship giving
access, directly or indirectly, to information intended to be available only for a corporate purpose and not for the personal benefit of anyone."' 8 Thus, according to the Cady analysis, officers,
directors, and controlling stockholders do not exhaust the class
49
of persons subject to the disclose or abstain rule.

Cady paved the way for expansion of rule lOb-5 in another
respect. It eliminated the necessity of proving the common law
elements of fraud and deceit. Arguably, Cady preserves the requirement that rule 10b-5 liability for nondisclosure be premised
upn a special relationship between the parties to the transaction,50 but not necessarily upon a fiduciary relationship by com51
mon law standards.
The concept of the corporate insider was further extended
in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. 5 2 The defendants in Texas

Gulf were corporate executives and employees who became
53
privy to the startling results of Texas Gulf drilling in Ontario.
Before news of a highly promising ore discovery was adequately
disclosed to shareholders, certain individual defendants
purchased large amounts of the stock or "calls" 54 for their per47. Id. at 908-09.
48. Id. at 912. A further justification for extention of the disclose or abstain rule to a non-corporate or "quasi" insider is the inherent unfairness of
permitting a party to take advantage of information he knows is unavailable
to those with whom he is dealing.
49. Id. at 911.
50. Id. at 912.
51. Id. at 910 n.8. Rule 10b-5 is described as a broad remedial provision
aimed at reaching misleading or deceptive activities "whether or not they
are precisely and technically sufficient to sustain a common law action for
fraud and deceit."
52. See Barnet, supra note 35, at 284 n.36; see also SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulfur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
53. 401 F.2d at 843-48. Texas Gulf Sulphur was a corporation engaged in,
among other things, the exploration and mining of certain minerals. The
promising results of the drilling expedition in Ontario, Canada showed the
area to be a rich source of copper, zinc, and silver.
54. A "call" is a negotiable option contract by which the bearer has the
right to buy from the writer of the contract, a certain number of shares of a
particular stock at a fixed price on or before a certain agreed upon date.
The very nature of a call is highly suggestive of the fact that defendants who
purchased them were almost dead certain the stock would go up.

1981]

Market Insider Liability

sonal accounts. 55 The Second Circuit ruled that anyone in possession of material, inside information 56 is an insider within the
meaning of the federal securities laws and must therefore disclose that information or refrain from trading.
The court found it unnecessary to premise the duty to disclose upon any special relationship, and instead took the position that it is superior access to material, inside information
which triggers the duty to disclose. 5 7 The Second Circuit thus
embarked upon a more radical departure from common law
standards of liability than had the earlier Cady court.5 8
Texas Gulf Sulphur forged ground for still another dimension of prohibited conduct under rule lOb-5. Two of the individual defendants had "tipped" 59 news of the ore strike to certain
outsiders who proceeded to purchase corporate shares. The de60
fendants were held liable for the profits made by their tippees.
Thus, an insider can be held liable for conveying nonpublic information to third persons who in turn trade on the basis of such
55. 401 F.2d at 843-44.
56. Id. at 849. Facts having a bearing upon the probable future of a company and therefore crucial to an individual's decision to buy, sell or hold the
company's securities were deemed to be just as material as facts disclosing
the earnings and distribution of the corporation. Whether or not a fact was
material under rule lob-5 would depend upon a balancing of both the
probability that the event would occur and its anticipated magnitude in
light of the company's overall activities. Id.
57. 401 F.2d at 848. The court rested its holding on the conclusion that
"the rule is based in policy on the justifiable expectation of the marketplace
that all investors ... have relatively equal access to material information."
The position espoused by the Second Circuit, that equality of information
was the legislative intent behind lOb-5, is in contention with the theory that
the purpose of lOb-5 was to prohibit corporate insiders from abusing their
positions of trust. Barnet, supra note 35, at 824-25.
58. 40 S.E.C. at 912. Cady specifically referred to a "relationship" that
gave access to inside information. Apparently, the Texas Gulf Sulphur
court relies exclusively upon the "access" aspect of the Cady test.
59. '"Tipping" is defined as the selective disclosure of material inside information. See Faberge, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 10174 (1973); Investors Management Co., Exchange Act Release No. 9267 (1971). Thus, if an
insider conveys material inside information to a third party, the insider is a
tipper, the third party is his tippee. The SEC has indicated that a tippee
need not know or have reason to know that the tipped information is nonpublic to incur liability. In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 n.17
(1961); accord, Comment, Deterrence of Tippee Trading Under Rule 10b-5,

38 U. Cm. L. REV. 372, 386-84 (1971). But see Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 353 F. Supp. 264, 273 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), which
requires knowledge of materiality as an element of plaintiffs case.
60. An individual who obtains a pipeline to material inside information
from corporate personnel and uses such information for his own profit can
be held liable as a tippee under rule lOb-5. Although a tippee incurs the
disclosure obligations of an insider, he is distinguishable from the latter in
that he does not have a legitimate business reason for knowing the inside
information. JACOBS, supra note 9, at § 66.02(a). To incur liability, a tippee
must have reason to know that the tipped information is nonpublic.
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information before it is made public. Liability accrues whether
or not the insider trades with the informational edge. 6 1
Persons who purchased Texas Gulf stock and calls on the
basis of tips received from insiders were not named as defendants in the SEC complaint. Despite the fact that the issue of
tippee liability was not directly before the Texas Gulf court,
Judge Waterman cautioned that one who trades on a tip is as
culpable under rule lOb-5 as is the insider who transmits the
tip.6 2

The Second Circuit had the opportunity to squarely address
this issue in Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc. 63 As a prospective underwriter for a new issue of Douglas
Aircraft Company stock, Merrill Lynch became privy to an unfavorable forecast of the plaintiff company's earnings. 64 Defendant leaked this news to certain preferred customers who
unloaded their shares before the news was publicly announced. 65 The Second Circuit ruled that these trading tippees
violated rule lOb-5 because they knew or should have known the
confidential nature of the information. The Commission also
censured Merrill Lynch 66 whose liability67could have been predicated on either insider or tippee status.
61. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulfur Co., 401 F.2d at 852-53. Tipping is in violation of rule lOb-5(3). A non-trading tipper is in pari delicto with his tippee.
Kuehnert v. Texstar Corp., 412 F.2d 700 (5th Cir. 1969).
62. 401 F.2d at 853. Cases subsequent to Texas Gulf Sulfur have settled
the issue of tippee liability. See, e.g., Radiation Dynamics, Inc. v. Goldmuntz, 464 F.2d 876, 887, 890 (2d Cir. 1972) (one in possession of material
inside information, "be he an insider or tippee. . ." must disclose that information or abstain from trading); Kuehnert v. Texstar Corp., 412 F.2d 700,
702-05 (5th Cir. 1969) (invoked the clean hands doctrine to bar suit by a tippee who suffered losses as a result of false and misleading inside information); Ross v. Licht, 263 F. Supp. 395, 410 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) ("tippees are
subject to the same duty as insiders .

.

63. 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974).
64. Id. at 232. The revised earnings report projected a sharp decrease in
earnings for 1966, with a potentially "no profit" situation accruing, and a
substantially decreased projected earnings for 1967.
65. Within four days, defendant tippees had sold more than 165,000
shares of plaintiff's stock on the New York Stock Exchange. This was
nearly one half of the total shares traded. The rash of selling caused a dramatic decline in the market price of Douglas stock. Id. at 233.
66. Matter of Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &Smith, Inc., Exchange Act
Release No. 8459 (1968).
67. It seems reasonable to regard Merrill Lynch as an insider since, as
plaintiff's underwriter, it had a duty to disclose all material, inside information about the corporation. See JENNINGS & MARSH, supra note 24, at 948
n.15. It is conceivable though, that Merrill Lynch might itself be regarded as
a tippee who in turn tipped favored customers. The latter would thus comprise a group of "remote tippees." Theoretically, tippee liability under rule
lob-5 could extend to all persons who profited on trades traceable to the
original tip. To date, however, the courts have declined to impose liability
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Thus far, rules of insider trading have been applied to individuals other than traditional corporate insiders only if those individuals have some connection with an inside source of
information. Absent some pipeline to a corporate source, it is
doubtful that insider liability under lOb-5 would attach. In Mills
v. Sarjem Corp.,68 for example, a syndicate purchased all the
stock of a private company which owned two toll bridges across
the Delaware River. It then resold the stock at a price roughly
twice what it had paid. 69 Former shareholders brought suit
claiming that the syndicate had fraudulently manipulated corporate assets, but were denied recovery under rule lOb-5 beby an "outsider" and not on the
cause the scheme was conceived
70
basis of inside information.
At some point, however, an outsider who plans to obtain
control of a corporation becomes an insider. Under the Williams
Act, 7 1 a tender offeror is required to disclose the planned acquisition to target shareholders 72 once it has accumulated five percent of the target's outstanding stock or has begun to negotiate
with the target's board of directors and thus been exposed to
inside corporate data.73 The scope of the terms "insider" and
"tippee" depends in part, therefore, on the concept of inside information.
The Concept of Market Insider Liability Under lOb-5
To illustrate potential situations in which market insider liability under rule lOb-5 may accrue, consider the following hypotheticals. Management may know that a favorable analysis of
Conglomerate Company along with a recommendation to buy its
stock is about to be released by a top-notch brokerage firm. Disbeyond the orig.nal tippers and tippees. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 312
F. Supp. 77, 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
68. 133 F. Supp. 753 (D.N.J. 1955).
69. Id. at 759.
70. Id. at 764-65. Note that the defendants in Mills, a 1955 case, would
now be liable under the "Williams Act." See note 71 infra.
71. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1) (1976). Collectively, five new sections of the
Exchange Act, adopted in 1968 and amended in 1970, comprise the act referred to as the Williams Act. The provisions are designed to regulate
tender offers and changes of control. Under the Williams Act, an individual
or group who acquires at least five percent of a security registered under
section 12 of the 1933 Act must make a public offer to the issuer's shareholders and must also meet the SEC's registration requirements.
72. A target company is the company which the tender offeror attempts
to acquire.
73. See, e.g. In re Ward La France Truck Corp., 13 S.E.C. 373 (1943). The
SEC indicated that a corporation which had agreed to purchase a controlling block of stock and which had access to information not generally available to the public, was an insider for purposes of the rule. See also
JENNINGS & MARSH, supra note 24, at 951.
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closure of this information would precipitate an immediate market reaction. The price of shares would adjust to reflect the
public's increased interest in the company.7 4 Knowledge that
Conglomerate will shortly split its stock, 7 or that a wealthy individual has offered to buy a block of its shares at a price above
the premium, 76 if communicated, would become a market stimulant. Similarly, anyone who knows of Conglomerate's plan to acquire Target Company has77information which, if revealed, would
stimulate market trading.
Material, nonpublic market information is present in each of
the above cases. Market information relates to the phenomenon
of supply and demand. It is distinguishable from inside corporate information in that it has an influence upon the value of a
corporation's shares which is wholly independent 78 of any structural or internal change within that corporation. For instance,
investors who know that Conglomerate is about to be highly recommended take a minimal risk if they purchase its stock. They
can readily predict a jump in the price of Conglomerate shares
and have a distinct advantage over other traders if they invest
before the recommendation appears. No change in Conglomerate's earning power or the value of its assets has enhanced its
desireability as a purchase; it is the fact of the forthcoming recommendation which appreciates the value of Conglomerate
stock.
Not all market information is inside information. In fact, because it is most often generated by forces outside the company
whose shares are affected, 79 market information is normally accessible to anyone. There are a variety of ways, however, in
74. See, e.g., Butcher &Sherrard, Exchange Act Release No. 9894, [1972]
L. REP. (CCH) 79,135.
75. See, e.g., Hausman, West, &Largay, Stock Splits, Price Changes, and
Trading Profits: A Synthesis, 44 J. Bus. 69 (1971). See also Hafner v. Forest
Labs., Inc., 345 F.2d 167 (2d Cir. 1965). In Harner, a corporation's failure to
disclose an impending four percent stock dividend to a shareholder from
whom it repurchased shares was held not to be a violation of rule lOb-5 because the dividends would not have given plaintiff any greater equity interest in the corporation. In dicta, however, the court asserted that under
appropriate circumstances, knowledge of a stock dividend would be material market information. The case stands for the proposition that dividends
and stock splits have potential market importance.
76. See, e.g., Reed v. Riddle Airline, 266 F.2d 314, 315, 319 (5th Cir. 1959)
(insider failed to disclose that a wealthy individual was interested in
purchasing shares where those purchases caused an increase in the price of
stock).
77. See Fleischer, Mundheim &Murphy, An Initial Inquiry into the Responsibility to Disclose Market Information, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 798, 810
(1973) [hereinafter cited as Fleischer].
78. Id. at 799.
79. Id.
FED. SEC.
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which market information may become inside information.
Market information may be selectively released by someone
outside the corporation to someone inside, as where management receives prior notice of the broker's recommendation. Or,
corporate insiders may have prior access to market information
which they themselves generate. Illustrative, is management's
knowledge of its own decision to announce a stock split or the
repurchase of outstanding shares.8 0
As long as the recipients of material, nonpublic market information occupy a position inside the issuing company, trading
in advance of disclosure is clearly in breach of a fiduciary duty
owed shareholders. Liability under rule lOb-5 attaches as if the
trade were based on secret information about the corporation
itself. The distinction between market and corporate information in such a case is immaterial. The more difficult question is
whether rule lOb-5 is properly invoked to control trades by outsiders who obtain their information at the marketplace and not
from a corporate source.
Nonpublic market information is routinely available to market professionals such as brokers, dealers, and exchange members. The activities of these specialists are, however, closely
monitored by the SEC.8 1 Moreover, availability of nonpublic
market information to specialists is justified to the extent that it
is used to stabilize and protect the marketplace.
A different situation arises when a nonspecialist becomes
intimate with the functioning of the marketplace and competes
with an informational edge. Public policy does not justify this
individual's use of nonpublic information. The point is neatly
illustrated where a third person discovers the target of a corporate acquisition plan before it is publicly announced. It has
been argued that trading with such an informational advantage
amounts to insider trading and is contrary to the policies which
82
underly rule lOb-5.
80. See generally Fleischer, supra note 77, at 840-45.
81. The 1934 Act § 11(b) provides:
If under the rules and regulations of the Commission a specialist is permitted to act as a dealer, or is limited to acting as a dealer, such rules
and regulations shall restrict his dealings so far as practicable to those
reasonably necessary to permit him to maintain a fair and orderly market....
15 U.S.C. § 78k(b) (1970).
82. See SEC v. Campbell, [1972] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 93,580 (C.D.
Cal. 1972) (Campbell, a financial columnist, "scalped" his own column.
That is, he purchased shares in certain companies and then wrote favorable
articles about those companies intending to benefit from the anticipated
price rise). Cf. In re Blythe &Co., Inc. [1969] FED. SEC. L REP. (CCH) T
77,647. Blythe was found to have violated rule 10b-5 by trading in government securities while in possession of material nonpublic information con-
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The classification of certain traders as market insiders may
well be appropriate. For purposes of imposing an affirmative
duty of disclosure, there seems no reason to distinguish between a trade based upon an individual's superior access to the
market and a trade based upon a corporate exectutive's superior
access to facts about his own business. If measured by the immediate impact on stock price alone, these transactions are
equally damaging to the uninitiated investor.
The problems of identifying insiders and defining inside information bring the issue of the Chiarella case sharply into focus: Is there a point at which a corporate outsider with regular
access to inside information becomes a market insider within
the reach of rule lOb-5? The law in the area has not yet hardened and judges continue to decide the issue according to their
personal theories about why the rule was promulgated. The
fundamental conflict is between those judges who believe that
the rule was designed to democratize the marketplace by providing investors with relatively equal access to information, and
those who believe that the rule was, more specifically, intended
to prevent abuses by corporate insiders.
PREFACE TO THE CHIARELLA

CASE

Chiarella was not a director, officer, or majority shareholder
of either the acquiring corporation or its target, nor had he been
tipped by a corporate insider. Chiarella could not, therefore, be
cast in the traditional role of a corporate insider.8 3 Chiarella obtained his informational edge through a combination of resourcefulness and strategic positioning within the
marketplace.8 4 Both parties conceded that Chiarella had converted confidential information from the corporation that entrusted the printing firm with their documents. 85 The theory
upon which Chiarella successfully defended, however, was that
absent a special relationship to other traders and investors, rule

10b-5 would not apply.
The Chiarella case presented a perfect opportunity for the
Supreme Court to crystallize the parameters of rule lOb-5. Unfortunately, the Court did not address whether Chiarella could
cerning the terms of a new government issuance. Id. at 83,398. See also
Jacobs, supra note 9, at § 66.02.
83. See notes 44-45 supra.
84. See notes 9-12 supra.
85. Petitioner's Reply Brief at 4, United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358
(2d Cir. 1978), rev'd, 445 U.S. 222 (1980). Counsel concedes that: "[W]e do
not dispute the proposition that Chiarella violated his duty as an agent to
the offeror corporations not to use their confidential information for personal profit."
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have been convicted on a theory that he breached a fiduciary
duty to the acquiring corporation. 86 Chiarella might have been
implicated on that theory under common law agency principles. 87 An agency link between Chiarella and the acquirer
might have supplied the special relationship which, according to
the majority, is an indispensable element of a rule lOb-5 offense. 88 Even had the existence of an agency relationship been
established, however, the fact that the acquirer was neither a
purchaser nor seller of target company securities might have
provided an alternate basis for the ruling that no actionable vio89
lation of lOb-5 had occurred.
Chiarellaalso raised, without deciding, the issue of whether
rule lOb-5 is violated where one fails to disclose market information 90 as opposed to information concerning the corporation itself. It is doubtful that Chiarella was a "tippee" within the
meaning of the statute. Tippee status usually arises from one's
participation after the fact of an insider's breach of a fiduciary
duty.91 Chiarella was, however, in the nonlegal sense of the
word, tipped off to market information by virtue of his continued
exposure to corporate data. Chiarella's critical position within
the marketplace raises important questions regarding his status
under the securities laws. At what point should one with such
exposure be considered privy to the corporation? To what extent does one with superior access to market data become a
market insider? Are market insiders subject to the strictures of
rule 10b-5? Unfortunately, the Chiarella opinion does not satisfactorily put these issues to rest.
Assume, hypothetically, that Chiarella had been found liable as an agent of the acquiring corporation: Would agency status have formed the basis for liability to the target company? In
other words, as its agent, would Chiarella have been sufficiently
"inside" the acquiring corporation to justify an imposition of the
same rules of disclosure which applied to the tender offeror?
The foregoing observations should alert the reader to the
tapestry of intriguing issues raised by the Chiarella case. The
following is an analysis of how the case was decided at each
level of appeal.
86. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. at 236.
87. Brief for the United States Government at 35, Chiarella v. United
States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY
§§ 395, Comments a, c; 393 Comment a; 390 & Comment a; 388 (1933).
88. 445 U.S. at 231-32.
89. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
90. See note 87 supra.
91. 445 U.S. at 230 n.12.
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Evolution of the Case
An investigation of Chiarella's trading activities was initi92
ated by the SEC in May, 1977. Pursuant to a consent decree,
Chiarella was compelled to disgorge his ill-gotten profit and divide it among the persons from whom he had purchased target
corporation shares.
Despite civil sanctions, Chiarella was indicted 9 3 by a federal
grand jury on seventeen counts 94 of securities fraud for trading
in violation of section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 of the Exchange Act.
The defense moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground that
it failed to charge Chiarella with a crime. 95
The district court denied defendant's motion to dismiss 96
and found Chiarella guilty on each count. 97 The finding of fraud
was two-fold. In the first instance, Chiarella's misappropriation
of corporate secrets was compared to embezzlement by a bank
employee 98 and declared to be a fraud upon the offeror corporations. 99 In addition, the district court found that Chiarella's failure to disclose material facts had tainted the transaction with an
"inherent unfairness"'10 0 and consequently was a deceptive
practice within the meaning of rule lOb-5.
Speaking for the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, Judge
Kaufmann affirmed the lower court and maintained that the antifraud provisions of the Exchange Act were designed to promote equal access to market information among investors. 10 1 As
the regular recipient of nonpublic information, Chiarella was
92. 588 F.2d at 1364.
93. The indictment was brought pursuant to the penalty provision of
section 32(a) of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78 FF(a)
(1976).
94. 588 F.2d at 1364. Each represents one of Chiarella's seventeen individual purchases of target company stock.
95. United States v. Chiarella, 450 F. Supp. 95, 96 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'd,
588 F.2d 1358 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
96. 450 F. Supp. at 95.
97. 588 F.2d at 1364 n.7. Chiarella was sentenced to one year imprisonment but the sentence was suspended after one month and he was placed
on five year probation.
98. 450 F. Supp. at 96.
99. Id. at 97. This position was supported by the fact that Chiarella's
purchases created an artificial demand in the target company's stock thus
inflating its price and potentially frustrating the plans of the acquiring corporation.
100. See In re Cady, Roberts &Co., 40 S.E.C. at 912. The phrase "inherent
unfairness" was first used to describe trading on nonpublic information by
officers, directors and controlling shareholders.
101. United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358, 1362 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd, 445
U.S. 222 (1980).
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deemed to be a market insider, 10 2 and accordingly, was under an
affirmative duty to disclose to the target sellers. 0 3
Judge Meskill, in a vigorous dissent, argued that the majority had usurped both the legislature's and the SEC's functions
by creating the new category of market insider °4 His chief objection, however, was the inappropriate, retroactive effect which
the unprecedented extension of criminal liability 0 5 under rule
106
lOb-5 would have upon market insiders such as the defendant.
ANALYSIS OF THE SUPREME CouRT's POSrION

The Special Relationship Test
Justice Powell narrowly framed the issue according to the
specific facts of the case: Does one who has learned from the
confidential documents of one corporation of plans to secure
control of a second corporation violate section 10(b) of the Exchange Act if he fails to disclose the impending takeover before
trading in the target company's securities? 10 7 There is no unequivocal answer to that question in the opinion. What does
emerge from the opinion is a philosophy of fraud under section
10(b) of the Exchange Act. In defining those circumstances
which trigger a duty to disclose under section 10(b) and rule
lOb-5, Justice Powell adopted the common law doctrine of fraudulent misrepresentation-there can be no fraud absent a duty to
102. 588 F.2d at 1364. Although Chiarella did not hold a position inside
the corporation, he was constantly exposed to sensitive and confidental corporate information by virtue of his strategic position inside the market. For
a more detailed analysis of the market insider, see Fleischer, supra note 77,
at 845-50.
103. 588 F.2d at 1365.
104. Id. at 1376-77 (Meskill, J., dissenting).
105. Willful violations of the securities laws or the rules promulgated
under them are punishable by fine and imprisonment. The Commission
does not prosecute criminal cases itself, but transmits the evidence to the
Justice Department, which decides whether to prosecute. See note 13
supra. Defendant need not know that he acted in violation of the securities
laws in order for his conduct to be considered willful. A showing, of negligence, however, would be insufficient to sustain a conviction. See United
States v. Koenig, [1974] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 94,765 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
The courts have consistently rejected arguments by defendants that various provisions of the securities laws are unconstitutionally vague as the basis for criminal prosecutions. See, e.g., United States v. Wolfson, 405 F.2d
779 (2d Cir. 1968).
106. For a discussion of the proposition that the Second Circuit's interpretation of rule 10b-5, though a proper expansion of the rule, was unconstitutionally applied in Chiarella,see Murphy, Rule lOb-5: Birth of the Concept
of Market Insider & Its Application in a Criminal Case-United States v.
Chiarella,8 FoRD. UPB. L.J. 468 (1979).

107. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 224 (1980).
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speak. 10 8 He expressly rejected the theory upon which Chiarella was convicted. Rather, he maintained that the duty to speak
arises from a relationship between the parties and not merely
from one's superior ability to acquire information because of his
position in the market. 10 9
Powell's refusal to extend liability under rule lOb-5 to market insiders such as Chiarella may reflect the same fear which
was expressed by Judge Meskill in the court below, 110 viz., a fear
that the expansion of securities laws might inhibit the productive activities of the "whole corporate universe."1 1' 1 Perhaps, for
that reason, he adhered to the argument that federal courts are
simply "not at liberty to legislate" a different result from that
which Congress has ordained. 112 The possibility that Powell
may have been motivated by policy considerations is arguable
because the statute is capable of a much broader construction
113
than he permits.
Powell's analysis commenced with an acknowledgment that
neither the language of the statute nor its legislative history specifically addresses the consequences of a failure to disclose material information under rule lOb-5. Powell then demonstrated
that case law resolution of the issue has largely reflected the notions of fiduciary responsibility developed under state and federal law. Focusing on the "relationship" aspect' 14 of the Cady
opinion, Powell interpreted it as an outgrowth of the common
law of fraud and deceit.
Although the facts surrounding Cady did not necessitate
departure from a theory of liability based on common law principles of fiduciary responsibility, the SEC set the stage for expansion of the rule beyond the common law. Rule lOb-5 was
described as a broad remedial provision aimed at reaching misleading or deceptive activities "whether or not they are precisely
108. Id. at 232.
109. Id. at 233.
110. United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358, 1377 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd, 445
U.S. 222 (1980).
111. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977) citing 588 F.2d at
1377. It is submitted in response to the court's "fear," that federal regulation of the type of fraud at issue in Chiarella,would in no way undermine
the productive activities of market specialists. A requirement that market
players share nonpublic information which they have no bona fide business
need to conceal would not preclude the market specialists from taking full
advantage of an informatoinal edge which is the result of skill, acumen, and
insight.
112. 445 U.S. at 234, citing Touche Ross & Co. v. SEC, [1976] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 95,742 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
113. See notes 32-33 supra. The drafters clearly intended to give the SEC
and the courts ample room to catch fraud.
114. 445 U.S. at 227-8.
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and technically sufficient to sustain a common law action for
fraud and deceit." 115 Thus, rule lOb-5 could apply without regard to the common law requirement of privity between the parties to the transaction.
Powell cited Texas Gulf Sulphur 116 in support of the proposition that there must be a duty to disclose before one is obligated to do so. The court in Texas Gulf Sulphur, however, relied
upon the "access" aspect of the Cady rule, suggesting that access alone was enough to trigger the duty to disclose or abstain
117
from trading.
Additionally, Justice Powell relied upon Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States 118 in support of his principal thesis
that the duty to disclose must be premised on a special relationship. In Affiliated Ute, the defendants, like Chiarella, were not
traditional corporate insiders, tippees, or broker dealers. The
Court was, however, able to premise liability upon a special relationship between the parties. 1 19 Albeit technically dicta, the
Court strongly suggested that those who have a relationship
with the functions of the market meet the special relationship
test. 120 The Ute Court perceived rule lOb-5 as inclusive and
opined that "its fundamental purpose is to substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor, and
thus to achieve a1 high standard of business ethics in the securi12
ties industry."
Powell concluded from this prior case law that the failure to
disclose material, market information might be actionable as
fraud under section 10(b) even in the absence of express statutory language addressing such nondisclosure. He again urged,
115. In re Cady, Roberts &Co., 40 SEC at 910 (1961).
116. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
117. 401 F.2d at 848.
118. 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
119. Id. at 152. Affiliated Ute involved a bank which had agreed to act as
a transfer agent for the Ute Development Corporation (UDC). The UDC
was formed pursuant to the Ute Partition act of 1954 and provided for the
distribution of Ute assets to tribe members. Two bank employees went beyond their roles as transfer agents. They bought Ute stock for their own
accounts and then sold it in a secondary market at a substantially higher
price. Mr. Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority of the Court, stated
that had the bank functioned solely as a transfer agent, no duty of disclosure would have arisen. Because the Bank had agreed to supervise transactions and ensure their compliance with UDC rules, it acquired fiduciary
obligations to its Ute customers.
120. Id. at 152-53. The fact that defendants acted as market makers
clearly influenced Blackmun's determination that a duty of disclosure had
arisen. See Fleischer, supra note 77, at 819-20.
121. 406 U.S. at 152, citing SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375
U.S. 180 (1963).
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however, that liability must spring from a relationship of trust
and confidence between the parties.
Powell distilled two principal flaws from the appellate
court's conclusion that a market insider with regular access to
corporate secrets falls within the purview of rule lOb-5: first,
that "not every instance of financial unfairness constitutes
fraudulent activity under section 10(b); '' 122 and second, that because Chiarella was neither an agent nor a fiduciary of the issuer corporation, "the element required to make silence
123
fraudulent-a duty to disclose-[was] absent from the case."'
Powell also stated that disparity of access to information between the parties to a transaction was not, as the Second Circuit
concluded, the crux of the offense. The Williams Act, which
qualifiedly allows corporations to use nonpublic information,
that Congress never intended a parwas submitted as evidence
12 4
ity of information rule.
In fact, the acceptance of such practices by the SEC should
allay fears that an extension of rule 10b-5 to certain market insiders would interfere with the routine activities of traders. The
provision signifies sensitivity to the needs of the securities into restrict the use of
dustry but is not inconsistent with attempts
125
misappropriated market information.
Finally, Justice Powell voted to reverse the circuit because
the government's argument that Chiarelia had breached a duty
to the acquiring corporation and his employer was not properly
presented to the jury.126 Powell did not address Chiarella's potential liability for breach of duty to the acquiring corporation.
The opinion clearly indicates Powell's reluctance to create a
new category of market insiders and a present concern that further extension of the securities laws might ultimately preclude
the market professional from taking advantage of his expertise
and the knowledge of his own objectives. The tone of the opinion casts doubt upon whether Powell would have sustained a
122. 445 U.S. at 232, citing Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462
(1977).
123. 445 U.S. at 233.
124. See also General Time Corp. v. Talley Indus., Inc., 403 F.2d 159 (2d
Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1026 (1969). The court found that defendant
Talley did not violate rule lOb-5 by purchasing up to five percent of the target company's securities without disclosing his plans for a merger. Note
that the General Time decision came down prior to enactment of the Williams Act.
125. See note 113 and accompanying text, supra. It is again urged that
public policy does not dictate the extension of General Time benefits to
Chiarella. He took no economic risk and his purchases were not the result
of a legitimate analysis of the marketplace.
126. 445 U.S. at 237.
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conviction of this particular defendant under any circumstances.
Justice Stevens concurred with the Powell mandate that the
defendant must breach an identifiable duty in order to incur
criminal or civil liability under rule lOb-5.12 7 He also agreed that
Chiarella owed no duty of disclosure to the sellers of target corporation securities.
Stevens wrote a separate opinion in order to stress the fact
that had the jury been properly instructed as to Chiarella's liability to his employer and his employer's client, the case might
have been decided differently. As to the latter issue, Stevens
was noncommital. He used the broad language of the statute to
legitimize the argument that Chiarella's actions may have constituted "a fraud or a deceit" upon the offeror corporation "in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security."'128 Alternatively, he noted that because the offeror corporation was not
privy to Chiarella's purchases, that conduct might fall short of
29
being an actionable violation of section 10(b) and rule lOb-5.1
Ultimately, Stevens agreed that reversal was proper for the
reason that Chiarella's conviction rested on the erroneous finding that he owed a duty of disclosure to target corporation sellers. This estimation of Powell's analysis points up the fact that
the Supreme Court has not necessarily exempted market insiders with access to confidential corporate information from the
antifraud provisions of the Exchange Act. Clearly, the Court
130
has not condoned Chiarella's conduct.
The MisappropriationTheory
Justice Brennan concurred with the majority because he
would abhor affirming Chiarella's conviction on the basis of a
legal theory inadequately explained to the jury. 131 His concurrence is with Powell's procedural treatment of the case.
Brennan, however, unequivocally rejected the majority's interpretation of the relevant substantive law. He did not agree
that a fiduciary relationship between the buyer and the seller is
an indispensable element of a rule lOb-5 offense. Rather, he sub127. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
128. Id. at 1119-20.
129. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S 723 (1975); see
also Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.) cert. denied,
343 U.S. 956 (1952). The "purchaser-seller" limitation on private rights of
action under rule lOb-5, originated in the Birnbaum decision and was recently reaffirmed in Blue Chip.
130. 445 U.S. at 238.
131. Id. (Brennan, J., concurring).
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scribed to a misappropriation theory. 132 According to this view,
it is the wrongful conversion of nonpublic information for personal profit which constitutes securities fraud under section
10(b). Although part of the majority in Chiarella, for the purpose of predicting the direction which the Court will follow in
future cases which hinge upon an interpretation of lOb-5, Justice
Brennan should be associated with the dissent.
Chief Justice Burger's dissent also promoted a misappropriation theory. Burger read section 10(b) to mean, literally, that
any person who has misappropriated nonpublic information is
subject to the disclose or abstain rule. He believed that repeated use of the word "any" in the statute negates the presumption that the rule applies only to corporate insiders. 133 In
Burger's view, the common law limitations upon the duty to disclose are based upon a recognition that an informational advantage obtained as a result of business acumen, experience and
skill should not be denied. It is not inconsistent with common
law policy to require disclosure where material information is
unlawfully acquired. 134
The Equal Access Theory
The legal theory expressed in Justice Blackmun's dissent is
almost parallel to that adopted by the Second Circuit. Blackmun conceded that the Chief Justice's misappropriation theory
would successfully incriminate Chiarella under rule lOb-5. In
Blackmun's view, however, Chiarella would be guilty of securities fraud even if he had obtained the information with
Pandick's consent.
His theory is that the antifraud rules were promulgated to
prevent profiteering by anyone who possesses an informational
advantage regardless of that individual's fiduciary obligations or
the manner in which the information was procured. 135 Blackmun agreed with the court of appeals that it is unequal access to
market information which triggers the duty to disclose or abstain under rule lOb-5. He further argued that federal securities
136
laws should be liberally rather than narrowly construed.
The essence of Blackmun's dissent is that the securities
laws were not intended to replicate the laws of fiduciary relationships. He insisted that the purpose of the Exchange Act is
to ensure fair dealing where the common law- does not ade132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

445 U.S. at 239.
Id. at 1121 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
445 U.S. at 239-41.
Id. at 245 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
445 U.S. at 245-46.
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quately protect investors and that disparity of access to inside
information is the gravamen of a rule lOb-5 offense.
Blackmun noted that strict application of caveat emptor is
rapidly being replaced by a less formalistic application of the
duty to disclose. Justice Powell, Blackmun urges, has put securities law in the "rear guard" of a movement toward consumer
137
protection.
CONCLUSION

The blatantly deceptive practices of big business operators
in the 1920's prompted codification of the federal securities laws.
The objective was to restore investor confidence by eliminating
disparities in the availability of information. The health of the
economy was at stake as the public shied away from a market in
38
which it was clearly the disadvantaged party.
Under the Powell approach to rule lOb-5, investors lose that
priority. The special relationship test of liability would limit application of rule lOb-5 to transactions between corporate insiders (or their tippees) and shareholders. The buying public
would be wholly unprotected from the misuse of special information except, perhaps, as the incidental beneficiary of a shareholder's suit. In fact, adoption of the special relationship
requirement casts serious doubt upon the continued vitality of a
private right of action for rule lOb-5 violations which occur during the course of an anonymous stock exchange transaction. A
plaintiff in such a position would not, ordinarily, be able to identify an insider as the purchaser or seller.
Justice Powell's resistance to the concept of market insider
liability is expressed as concern that such a rule would interfere
with the valuable stabilizing functions performed by market
professionals. The specialists' use of market information, however, is statutorily controlled and patently distinguishable from
the type of fraud involved in Chiarella. The unregulated use of
confidential information, such as the identity of a tenderor's target, operates to derange market prices. It is only logical to conclude therefore, that a trader should not be permitted to profit
from his relationship to the market simply because he has no
corresponding duty to the corporate source of the information
he receives.
Chiarella should not, however, be relied upon to validate
the purloining of market information. The majority is more reflective of a reluctance to convict the petitioner in the context of
137. Id. at 249.
138. See generally note 23 and accompanying text supra.
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questionable jury instructions than it is representative of strong
support for Powell's legal analysis. Three justices unequivocally
joined the Powell majority. Justice Stevens concurred with the
legal theory but warned against construing the decision as official approval of Chiarella's conduct. The second concurring
opinion disagreed with the majority's interpretation of rule lOb5, as did the two dissenting opinions. What appears, therefore,
to be a majority of six is, upon closer scrutiny, a predictable four
votes in support of the view that a Chiarella defendant, afforded
a proper trial in all respects, would be acquitted.
Moreover, the SEC, which is vested with broad regulatory
authority, gives every indication of exercising that authority in
such a way as to inhibit Chiarellatype conduct. 139 The Commission has, though in a limited way, already reacted to the Chiarella case. New rule 14(e) (3)140 is specifically addressed to tender
offers and would make it unlawful for one other than the prospective bidder to trade on the basis of nonpublic information
relating to a contemplated tender offer.
Chiarella exemplifies the difficulties involved in using rule
lOb-5 as the source of a duty of disclosure in cases involving
market information. When one considers the definitional
problems associated with identifying those individuals who owe
a duty of disclosure under rule lOb-5, the holding in Chiarellais
viscerally satisfying. Principles of fairness marshall against
holding Mr. Chiarella to such an abstract standard of liability. If
one believes, however, that the securities laws were designed to
protect investors by curbing the use of unfair informational advantages, then no-risk trading by market insiders cannot be justified.
PatriciaE. Stern
139. See In re Dirks, [1981] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 82,812 (1981). A
securities analyst violated rule 10b-5 by tip ing confidential information to a
select group of investment advisers. The SEC took the position that finding
a professional analyst in violation of insider trading rules would not "chill
other analysts from the legitimate and desirable function of seeking out corporate information." Id.
See also Lubasch, 5 Charged with Trading on Secret Merger Data, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 4,1981, at D1-D6, col. 2. Two of the men charged occupied key
sitions in two of Manhattan's most prominent investment banking firms.
ese two individuals apparently tipped inside information about corporate
takeover plans to three other individuals who used secret foreign bank accounts to buy stock in the target companies. According to the indictment,
these purchases yielded enormous profits to the five defendants. The prosecution, still pending, grew out of an extensive investigation initiated by the
United States Attorney's Office and the SEC.
140. 15 U.S.C. § 240.14e-3 (1980). See also Exchange Act Release No. 3417120 (1980) (Chiarella case prompted the adoption of the new rule).

